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 Although sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are not a new phenomenon, they have 
acquired certain notoriety in public debates in recent years, associated to the growing 
role they have come to play in global financial markets. The growth of these funds are 
part of larger process of accumulation of foreign exchange assets by developing 
countries, which also includes the large accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
during the boom that these countries have experienced over most of the current decades, 
reflecting both booming exports (due in part to high commodity, particularly mineral 
prices) and pro-cyclical capital flows. 
 This paper analyzes the rationale for such funds and the implications for the 
world economy. It is divided in six sections, the first of which is this introduction. 
Section II details the evolution of foreign exchange assets in different parts of the 
developing world, the relative importance of the current vs. the capital accounts as the 
source of those assets, and discusses some categorizations of SWFs. In Section III we 
review the rapidly growing literature on the determinants of reserve accumulation in 
developing countries, emphasizing in particular the competitiveness vs. self-insurance 
motives for such accumulation, and briefly examine some of the literature on optimal 
reserves. 
In Section IV, we develop a broader framework for the analysis of the motives 
for the accumulation of foreign exchange assets, in which we clearly differentiate 
between the role played by the current and the capital accounts, and between the 
structural vs. cyclical determinants of such accounts, and raise some political economy 
issues associated with the nature and management of these funds. In section V, we 
analyze the systemic implications of the analysis for the global and regional financial 
architectures and in section VI we draw some conclusions. 
II. THE ACCUMULATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AND 
THE RISE OF SWFs 
A remarkable feature of the international financial system in the last decade has 
been the worldwide rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by developing 
countries. Based on IMF data, between December 2001 and October 2007 (the latest 
figure available), global reserves tripled, from US$2.1 trillion to US$6.2 trillion. The 
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bulk of the increase has concentrated in the developing world: developing countries as a 
whole accounted for more than 80 percent of global reserve accumulation during this 
period, and their current reserves approach US$5 trillion (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Global Reserve Accumulation, US$billion (1998-2007)












































































































WORLD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
The growth in reserves has been steeper during the last few years. In particular, 
export-led Asian economies, particularly China and India, and commodity-producing 
countries, especially oil-exporting countries based in the Middle East, have accumulated 
the lion’s share of these increases. For example, of the US$1.6 trillion foreign exchange 
reserves increase in Asia (including Japan) between December 2003 and October 2007, 
three-fourths are accounted for by China and India. Oil-producing countries have also 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves at a remarkable pace. At end-October 2007, 
they had reserves in excess of US$430 billion, an increase of 2.5 times compared to five 
years earlier (as discussed below, we should add to this figure the amounts placed by 
these countries in SWFs, which are recorded separately). Combined together, China, 
India and oil-exporting countries accounted for more than half of the variation in world 
international reserves. Latin America has also shared in that trend, approximately 
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What has driven these developments? At an aggregate level, we can make a 
distinction between the contribution of the current account and that of the capital 
accounts. By focusing in particular on three regions, Developing Asia, the Middle East 
and Latin America (see Figure 3.A), we can see that in all of them there has been a 
substantial net transfer of resources towards the rest of the world from 2002 to 2006, as 
the change in reserves has been accounted to a large extent by current account 
surpluses. However, regional trends hide important differences at the country level. For 
example, in Developing Asia, while China and Singapore have experienced a net 
transfer of resources driven by buoyant current account surpluses, India has “borrowed” 
reserves instead, as the counterpart of its reserves hoarding is represented by net capital 
inflows (see Figure 3.B).In Latin America too there are some important differences to 
note. While Venezuela and Argentina show a path similar to China and Singapore, 
having accumulated reserves essentially as a result of current account surpluses, in 
Mexico and Colombia this process has been the outcome of net external financing (see 
Chart 3.C). Note, however, that in several cases the accumulation of official external 
assets, several of which are SWFs, tends to underestimate the importance of capital 
inflows as a source of reserve accumulation, as the accumulation of such official assets 
abroad is accounted for as a negative contribution to the capital account. This is the case 
of Singapore and Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Chile, in Latin America. 
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Figure 3.A 
Drivers of Reserve Accumulation, US$ billion (2002-06 cumulative)
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Figure 3.B 
Drivers of Reserve Accumulation, US$ million (2002-2006 cumulative)
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Figure 3.C 
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Furthermore, the relative importance of the current vs. capital account balance 
has changed through time, particularly in Latin America. Figure 4 shows indeed that, 
while the initial accumulation of reserves had an important component of current 
account surpluses, the capital account came to play a more important role during the 
two periods of “exuberance” in capital flows to Latin America identified by Ocampo 
(2007b): from mid-2004 to the first quarter of 2006 and, between mid-2006 and mid-
2007. The second period was particularly buoyant in terms of capital inflows and the 
accumulation of international reserves. Indeed, three-fifths of the reserves accumulated 
since the first quarter of 2004 were the result of the booming capital inflows 
experienced during this second period of “exuberance”. Furthermore, if we take out 
Venezuela, Latin America ceased to run a current account surplus in 
2007.
Figure 4
Current vs. capital accounts in six major Latin American economies
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The extraordinary process of reserve accumulation in the last few years is 
without parallel in recent history; yet it does not tell the whole story. In fact, the total of 
US$6.2 trillion underestimates the actual increase of foreign exchange assets, as an 
important part of those assets in some areas of the world has been accumulated in 
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Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), which tend to be run autonomously from traditional 
reserve management by central banks and/or finance ministries. Official holdings 
managed by SWFs are difficult to estimate because of limitations of information. In 
some cases, there may be also double counting (Truman, 2007). However, according to 
recent research by Morgan Stanley and Standard Chartered, SWFs across the world are 
thought to have about US$3 trillion of international assets under management, that is, a 
sum equivalent to fifty per cent of official reserve holdings (see Table 1). This compares 
with an estimated US$500 billion in 1990 (Johnson, 2007). These SWFs assets are on 
the whole additional to foreign exchange reserves. 
Table 1 
Estimated Size of Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Country Fund Name Assets (US$bn) Inception Year Source of Funds
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 875 1976 Oil
Norway Government Pension Fund 380 1996 Oil
Singapore Governemnt Investment Corp. 330 1981 Non-commodity
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabian funds (Various) 300 n.a. Oil
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 250 1953 Oil
China China Investment Corp. 200 2007 Non-commodity
Singapore Temasek Holdings 159.2 1974 Non-commodity
Russia Stabilization Fund 127 2004 Oil
Australia Future Fund 54 2006 Non-commodity
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 50 2005 Oil
Libya Oil Reserve Fund 50 2005 Oil
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 42.6 2000 Oil
US (Alaska) Permanent Fund Corp. 38 1976 Oil
Brunei Brunei General Reserve Fund 30 1983 Oil
South Korea Korea Investment Corp. 20 2005 Non-commodity
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 18 1993 Non-commodity
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 18 2000 Oil
Canada Alberta Heritage Fund 16 1976 Oil
Taiwan National Stabilisation Fund 15.2 n.a. Non-commodity
Venezuela National Development Fund 15 2005 Oil
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund 13 1999 Oil
New Zealand Superannuation Fund 11 2001 Non-commodity
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 9.8 2006 Copper
UAE Istithmar 8 2003 Oil
Oman State General RF 6 n.a. Oil
UAE Dubai International Capital 6 2004 Oil
Bahrain Unknown 6 1980 Oil
Chile Pension Reserve Fund 1.4 2006 Copper
Total 3049.2  
Source: Morgan Stanley; Standard Chartered 
Both phenomena are in fact interrelated. Aizenman and Glick (2007) identify 
two main reasons behind the recent accumulation of foreign assets in SWFs. The first is 
the recent boom in commodity prices, particularly oil. Mindful of the wastes and 
inefficiencies associated with the boom of the 1970s, these countries have preferred to 
save a share of the current gains in SWFs to smooth consumption and preserve the 
wealth of future generations. This represents by far the main reason behind the 
exponential growth of SWFs in recent years, as oil-producing countries’ SWFs account 
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for nearly three-quarters of total assets under management by these funds. At end-
October 2007 oil-exporting countries managed an estimated US$2.2 trillion of SWFs. 
Of these, about US$1.5 trillion are related to SWFs of countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and “[w]ith oil at or above $90, the future size and market impact of the large 
gulf funds is hard to overstate” (Setser and Ziemba, 2007). 
A second reason for the development of SWFs advanced by Aizenman and 
Glick (2007) is, as mentioned in other parts of the paper, the hoarding of international 
assets by non-commodity-exporting countries which are running persistent current 
account surpluses. Some countries seem to have more reserves than needed for 
precautionary motives, and have transferred part of them to special investment vehicles 
to maximize their returns. This is the case of East Asian countries, which have 
combined SWFs in excess of US$740 billion, to be added to more than US$2.2 trillion 
of foreign exchange reserves. 
While they have been a recurring subject on the headlines in the past few 
months, SWFs are not new, especially in countries rich in natural resources. SWFs have 
existed at least since the 1950s, when they were established in Kuwait in 1953 and in 
the Pacific Island of Kiribati three years later (The Economist, 2008). In the 1970s, 
many oil-exporting countries, particularly in the Middle East, followed suit, establishing 
their own SWFs. Recently, SWFs have gained prominence to coincide with the large 
current account surpluses run by commodity-based developing countries as well as non-
commodity exporting countries, particularly (but not only) in East Asia. According to 
some estimates, SWFs are likely to grow as much as to reach US$10-12 trillion within 
the next five to seven years (Johnson, 2007; Jen, 2007).  
There is no universal and generally agreed-upon definition of SWFs. However, 
they can be usefully defined as dedicated government-owned investment vehicles, 
funded by foreign exchange surpluses, which manage those assets separately from 
official reserves (Lowery, 2007) and invest them with a buy-and-hold perspective (IMF, 
2007). A narrower definition focuses on those government assets that are managed only 
to increase the wealth of a state, targeting high-risk, high-return assets (Kimmitt, 2008). 
Based on the source of funding, SWFs can be divided into commodity-based funds, 
which are established through the receipts from commodity exports owned or taxed by 
the government; and non-commodity-based funds (Lowery, 2007). 
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Regarding their purposes, SWFs can be broadly categorized into two main types: 
savings and stabilization funds. Savings funds are intended as permanent funds and are 
generally associated with non-renewable natural resources. They create a store of wealth 
for future generations so that they can benefit from the resources after their depletion. 
They build on economic theory which implies that part of non-renewable resources 
should be saved to smooth the country's inter-temporal consumption, in ways similar to 
individuals who save both for their retirement and to leave an inheritance to their 
children. A stabilization fund is a mechanism designed to reduce the impact of volatile 
fiscal revenues and/or foreign exchange receipts, linked to the pro-cyclical pattern of 
export prices or volumes. Stabilization funds often take the form of contingent funds, 
which accumulate resources when government revenues or the price of exports is high 
(above some threshold) and pay when they are low. 
A third category, sometimes mentioned separately (Davis et al., 2003) is a 
financing fund, whose operational rules are explicitly designed so it effectively absorbs 
a budget surplus or funds an overall budget deficit. An example is the Norwegian Fund, 
where the budget has to transfer to the fund revenues if the budget is in overall surplus; 
if the budget is in deficit, the latter is financed by the fund. A fourth category could be 
development funds, which allocate resources for funding priority socio-economic 
projects, such as infrastructure. If we assume that, almost by definition, SWFs invest 
abroad, such development funds could, for example, invest in infrastructure and other 
projects in neighboring countries, possibly benefiting the source country through 
increased. This could be done bilaterally or through regional and sub-regional 
development banks. 
In practice, SWFs may have different purposes based on the source of funding. 
For example, Kimmitt (2008) notes that, while commodity-based funds are prone to 
multiple and changing objectives, including fiscal revenue stabilization and sterilisation 
of foreign currency inflows, non-commodity-based funds are more commonly used to 
make stand-alone investments when a county has accumulated reserves in excess of the 
“optimal” level. 
The joint effects of the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and the rise of 
SWFs raise important policy issues, of both domestic and international character. At the 
domestic level, SWFs pose important questions on their role in helping achieve 
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macroeconomic policy goals and the criteria used to allocate their resources. At an 
international level, questions arise as to the impact of SWFs’ asset allocation and 
strategic investments on international financial stability. The first area has been recently 
investigated by Le Borgne and Medas (2007) for very small countries in the Pacific 
Islands. They find that SWFs, if well designed and integrated with the general budget, 
may be useful instruments to support a sound fiscal framework. The second area of 
exploration –i.e., the international financial stability implications—has attracted much 
more interest.1 Sections III and IV explore the first issue, whereas Section V explore the 
second. 
III. THE RATIONALE FOR RESERVE ACCUMULATION 
 The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by developing countries has 
given rise to a large body of literature that tries to explain the rationale for such 
accumulation. Such rationale is usually found in either one of two explanations: the 
“competitiveness” (or, in more pejorative terms, “mercantilist”) and the “self insurance” 
motives. 
The first has been emphasized by the literature on the “second Bretton Woods” 
(see Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003). This school of thought contends that 
efforts by Asian countries to maintain or enhance export competitiveness in the context 
of an export-led growth model has led them to run massive current account surpluses, 
the main counterpart of which is, at the world level, the US deficit. According to this 
point of view, the economic benefits of stable and weak exchange rates exceed, for the 
Asian countries, the costs of reserve accumulation. In turn, the persistent accumulation 
of dollar reserves by central banks allows the United States to rely on domestic demand 
to drive its economic growth. 
 Furthermore, the lack of coordination mechanisms among economies may have 
led to competitive interventions in the foreign exchange market by East Asian countries. 
Indeed, a few years ago, Sakakibara (2003) built an argument for financial cooperation 
among East Asian economies along these lines. A major problem in this regard is that 
competitive interventions reduce the benefits of interventions in foreign exchange 
markets by each individual country, transforming what from each country’s perspective 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Devlin and Brummitt (2007), Lowery (2007) and Truman (2007). 
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is a “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy (increase competitiveness vis-à-vis neighbors) into a 
“beggar-yourself” policy (costly accumulation of an excessive amount of reserves). 
Hence the potential benefits from cooperation. 
 However, although the “competitiveness” motives of foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation, as well as the absence of appropriate coordination mechanisms for 
exchange rate policies in export-led economies may be part of the explanation, the 
recent literature comes definitely in favor of “self-insurance” as the main motive for 
foreign exchange reserve accumulation. 
Indeed, there is clear evidence that the large accumulation of developing 
countries’ foreign exchange reserves started after the series of large and costly crisis, 
particularly the Asian one. It was, therefore, a rational response of each individual 
country to self insure against the risks of deep financial integration, particularly the 
growing exposure to financial instability. For many countries, reducing such risks also 
included avoiding IMF programs and their associated conditionality, which several 
countries, particularly in East Asia, regarded as extremely intrusive of national policy 
autonomy. 
Furthermore, the growing literature on this subject has concluded that the risks 
associated with financial integration go much beyond those that were seen as relevant in 
the past. In particular, the motive for self insurance against crises goes beyond the 
Greenspan-Guidotti rule that argues that countries should keep foreign exchange 
reserves at least equivalent to short term liabilities, as the risks associated with capital 
account liberalization are broader than those generated by the volatility of short-term 
capital flows. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the associated instability, real or 
potential, comes not just from foreign capital flows but also from domestic financial and 
non-financial agents, who incur in capital flight during crises and repatriation during 
booms. Therefore, the resulting precautionary demand would seem to require that a 
proportion of total external liabilities should be kept as reserves, with that proportion 
increasing the more open the capital account is (Ocampo, 2007a; Wyplosz, 2007). The 
two views can be reconciled by recognizing that such precautionary demand should be 
higher, in any case, if the proportion of short term or more easily reversible capital 
flows is higher. 
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This conclusion seems clearly consistent with the practice of developing 
countries. In a careful empirical investigation, Obstfeld et al. (2007) show a statistically 
robust and economically significant correlation of reserve levels with financial openness 
and financial development (proxied by M2/GDP), with the relevance of the latter 
variable increasing since the 1990s, and especially since the Asian crisis. Though they 
also find that other variables play a role, such as exchange rate policy and openness to 
trade (but, interestingly, not short term debt), they emphasize that the key to 
understanding the evolution of reserves, especially in recent years, is the inclusion of 
measures of financial openness and financial development into the analysis. 
Thus, the spread of financial globalization to developing countries, reflected in 
their greater financial openness, and the growth of banking systems and financial 
markets, explain much of the increase in foreign exchange reserves of these countries. 
Interestingly, there seems to be a long tradition in economic policy for this point of 
view, as the British economist Henry Thornton argued already in 1802 that reserves 
were not only important to meet fluctuations in the trade balance, but to head off or 
respond to “drains” that could happen via the banking system in periods of great and 
sudden fright, leading to what today would be called capital flight. 
An important and interesting question posed by Aizenmann (2007) and Rodrik 
(2006), among others, is why developing countries protected themselves from financial 
instability by increasing reserves rather than by reducing financial integration –
introducing, for example, prudential capital account regulations. Indeed, as Ocampo 
(2007a) has argued, “self-insurance” and its associated costs destroy, in a sense, the 
rationale for capital inflows in the first place, which is to transfer resources from rich to 
poorer countries. It also implies that the justification of capital account liberalization as 
a means to diversify risks is clearly insufficient. 
 The choice of self insurance over some “sand in the wheals” of international 
capital flows is a puzzle given the growing body of literature, including from the IMF 
(see Prasad et al., 2003 and Prasad, 2006, among many others), which provide empirical 
evidence that the costs of financial crises has been very high whereas the gains of 
financial integration are not as high as expected, because capital flows tend not to 
smooth consumption in emerging countries as had been predicted by orthodox 
theoretical frameworks. It is also a puzzle because the parallel accumulation of reserves 
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and external liabilities involved in “self insurance” generate two types of costs. First, it 
implies that costly liabilities have as a counterpart lower yielding assets. Secondly, it 
may force authorities to sterilize the accumulated reserves to avoid an excessive 
expansion of the domestic money supply, but such policy has quasi-fiscal costs, 
particularly in countries with high domestic interest rates. 
In this regard, it is useful to recall that countries that have liberalized their 
capital account less or more slowly (for example India and China) or have introduced 
precautionary regulations on the capital account (e.g., Chile and Malaysia) have been 
far less prone to crises and their massive costs. Therefore, prudential capital account 
regulations could reduce the costs of self insurance. Also, there may be other, less costly 
forms of self insurance. One example is the use of hedging techniques to neutralize 
potential terms of trade volatility, as well as the tendency of capital flow volatility to 
accentuate pro-cyclical swings in the availability of foreign exchange. Another example 
could be the use of new counter-cyclical external debt instruments for external 
borrowing, such as GDP-linked bonds, which could reduce debt service in bad times 
and increase it in good times 
As Rodrik (2006) argues, one reason why countries increased their foreign 
exchange reserves and did not diminish their external exposure using prudential capital 
account regulations may relate to the fact that controls on short term capital flows hurt 
powerful financial interests. Another partial explanation seems to be that financial 
integration is (or is perceived to be) inevitably linked to trade integration. A third, and 
perhaps most important explanation, is the perception (as well, as possibly, the reality) 
that it is difficult, for practical reasons (compounded, no doubt, with ideological ones), 
to significantly diminish vulnerability to massive capital outflows in the current 
international financial system. These outflows can include not only short-term debt but 
also outflows that result from decisions by “long-term” investors, such as FDI ones, 
who hedge their position via derivatives in a pro-cyclical way (Dodd and Griffith-Jones, 
2006). Foreign investors may also use more traditional practices that have similar 
effects, and which may have been enhanced in recent years, such as substituting 
domestic for foreign short-term debts, or vice-versa, depending on exchange rate 
expectations. Purely speculative flows (e.g., the carry trade), particularly in non-
transparent and often unregulated instruments (over the counter derivatives) add further 
elements of pro-cyclicality to capital flows and exchange rates that are difficult to 
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control at the national level. As noticed, capital flight and repatriation by domestic 
agents add to such pro-cyclical behavior. 
Interestingly, the current turbulence in the developed world could lead to 
regulations in the rich world and globally that could facilitate greater control of 
speculative flows in and out of developing countries and thus reduce the need to 
accumulate reserves for self-insurance purposes. It is important for developing countries 
to participate actively in the undergoing debate on post sub-prime crisis regulations and 
carefully monitor its results and implications for their own regulations. 
Both motives for accumulating foreign exchange reserves by developing 
countries are associated with the attempt to mitigate the volatility of exchange rates 
caused by terms of trade shocks and the vulnerability due to financial openness. 
Aizenmann and Riera-Crichton (2006) found that accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves mitigates the real exchange rate effects of term of trade shocks, and that this 
mitigation is especially important for exporters of natural resources. On average, natural 
resource dependence doubles both the impact of terms of trade shocks on the real 
exchange rate and the mitigation associated with accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves. This is very relevant for developing countries as there is growing empirical 
evidence that mitigating real exchange rate volatility increases growth. Aghion et al. 
(2006), for example, provide empirical evidence that exchange rate volatility reduces 
growth. Furthermore, higher international reserves/GDP increases the ability of 
smoothing adjustment to shocks, which is optimal in an open economy, in the 
framework of the permanent income hypothesis (Aizenmann, 2006). 
There is also an emerging literature that tries to model the “optimal” level of 
reserves. Perhaps the most interesting is that developed by Jeanne and Rancierere 
(2007). This model has one possible limitation from our perspective, in that it focuses 
on sudden stops; however, the probability of a sudden stop is shown to increase with the 
degree of international financial integration, which makes the model consistent with our 
analysis. 
The Jeanne and Ranciere formula calculates optimal levels of reserves as being 
higher the larger the output cost of a sudden stop, the higher the probability of such a 
sudden stop, the lower the cost of holding reserves and the greater risk aversion is. It is 
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therefore more complete than the Greenspan-Guidotti rule, which may explain why the 
Jeanne and Ranciere model seems to predict better the actual level of reserves than does 
the alternative rule of thumb. 
Regional calculations for optimal levels of reserves since the 1990s by Jeanne 
and Ranciere show that actual levels of reserves are quite similar to such optimal levels 
for Latin America. For Asia, this is also true until 1997. However, the estimates of these 
authors as well as those of Obstfeld et al. (2007) indicate that the accumulation of 
reserves in Asian countries since the late 1990s, but especially since 2004 seems 
excessive. One explanation for this could be that the likelihood of a catastrophic 
financial crisis, which though being fairly small would imply very negative effects, may 
lead to an overcautious attitude by developing countries to avoid it, leading to  
excessive reserves (Noyer, 2007). Along the lines that were mentioned at the beginning 
of this section, some coordination failure among countries following an export-led 
model may also be in place. 
It is also true that countries with lower costs of sterilization –linked to lower 
interest rates, often related to some level of financial repression, as is the case of China 
(Ginberg, et. al, 2005)—may have an advantage in this competitive accumulation of 
reserves. This may oblige countries like Korea to accumulate reserve to avoid further 
erosion of competitiveness. It has been argued (for example, by Noyer, 2007) that, in 
the context of great regional trade interdependence, such behavior creates possible trade 
tensions. This could pose the danger, both regionally and internationally of a costly rise 
in protectionism. 
Two caveats seem relevant in this regard, however. First, though low interest 
rates in China facilitate significantly accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by 
reducing the costs of sterilizing such reserves, low interest rates also reduce the 
profitability of Chinese banks (Yong, Yong Ding, 2007). Paradoxically this has required 
using part of the Chinese reserves to clean up their banks’ balance sheets. Furthermore, 
one potential use, and additional justification for large reserves, is that these could be 




IV. A BROADER FRAMEWORK 
A. Recollecting useful identities 
Although the literature on foreign exchange reserves discussed in the previous 
section has served to illustrate some of the determinants of foreign exchange asset 
accumulation by developing countries, it is incomplete for the analysis of SWFs for two 
major reasons. First of all, it does not clearly differentiate the rationale associated with 
the management of current account vs. capital account surpluses, an issue which is 
critical for SWFs, as we will see. Secondly, it does not clearly differentiate between 
structural vs. cyclical factors resulting in either type of surpluses. A sub-theme in the 
analysis of cyclical factors is fluctuations in commodity prices. 
The importance of differentiating the current vs. the capital account comes 
clearly from recalling the basic macroeconomic identity of an open economy: 
(1) ∆R – ∆F = X – M = S - I 
Here ∆R represents the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves2 (which in this 
context could be thought to include also the accumulation of resources in SWFs), ∆F 
are net external capital flows, X – M is the current account surplus, and S – I the 
savings surplus. To the extent that reserve accumulation merely reflects additional 
external financing, there is no net transfer of resources or, what is equivalent, no net 
accumulation of wealth in foreign exchange assets. Such accumulation can only take 
place when there is net savings or, what is equivalent, a current account surplus. The 
existence of a current account surplus is therefore critical. If there is no surplus –or, 
even worse, there is actually a current account deficit— the accumulation of foreign 
exchange assets (a positive ∆R) can only be seen as the counterpart of capital flows. 
Another way of expressing it is that when the counterpart of reserves is net capital 
flows and not a current account surplus, the former are merely “borrowed reserves” 
 If we consolidate the real and monetary accounts, the identity can also be written 
as: 
                                                 
2 So, we express it with the “normal” sign (a positive ∆R is an accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves), not that which comes in balance of payments accounting, where a negative ∆R reflects the 
accumulation of reserves –or, what is equivalent, the absorption of a balance of payments surplus. 
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(2) S – I = ∆M – ∆L – ∆F  
where M is broad money and L is lending by the domestic banking system.3 So, in 
order to accumulate net foreign exchange assets, capital flows must not be reflected in 
the creation of net domestic monetary assets (broad money less domestic lending). If 
they are, capital flows are merely the way to finance the additional domestic monetary 
assets, and we can talk of a “borrowed money supply”. 
 When understanding the rationale for SWFs, it is therefore important to start 
with the current account, as well as the underlying reasons for a current account 
surplus. If there is no current account surplus, it is difficult to rationalize the creation of 
SWFs. Indeed, were a SWF merely created on the basis of “borrowed reserves” –or, 
more broadly, “borrowed money”—we can think of it really as a form of financial 
intermediation, as it would not involve really the management of net foreign exchange 
assets. As we will see, the creation of a development bank or fund, or the accumulation 
of such borrowed funds in a regional or sub-regional development bank, could make 
sense under those circumstances, but not a SWF as such. 
B. The motivations for the accumulation of foreign exchange assets 
Based on these preliminary considerations, we can differentiate four major 
motives for the accumulation of net foreign exchange assets. 
 The first can be called the wealth substitution motive. In this case, there is a 
current account surplus that results from the exploitation of an non-renewable natural 
resource. We can think of this case as the transformation of an illiquid natural resource 
asset into net foreign exchange assets, which may be more or less liquid. As countries 
exploiting non-renewable natural resources generally have negative net investments, if 
the depletion of the resource is accounted for (Heal, 2006), a partial substitution of 
assets is the general pattern. Note that if there is no current account surplus, the natural 
resource would be transformed into domestic investment or merely consumed. 
There are, therefore, several factors that must be taken into consideration in this 
case. The first is that it may make sense to leave the resources under ground, 
                                                 
3 The “monies” included under M must obviously involve the same agents that intermediate the lending 
included as L. 
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particularly when the revenues it generates are merely consumed. If they are invested, 
the crucial question is the relation between the marginal profitability of the associated 
investments vs. the expected increase in the value of the natural resource.4 Domestic 
investment of the resource makes sense to the extent that it leads to accumulation of 
capital assets that result in sustainable long-term growth, particularly by diversifying 
the productive base of the domestic economy. Of course, if the resource is merely 
consumed (rentism), the crucial question is the inter-temporal time preference, as well 
as guaranteeing a smooth trajectory of consumption. The latter is, of course, essential 
from the point of view of inter-generational equity, but equity considerations also affect 
the social rate of time preference. 
A major problem in relation with these decisions is the political economy 
pressures that may result in the excessive consumption of the natural resource today or 
over-investments in infrastructure and “diversification” activities that may have low 
marginal social benefits. One case in point is, for example, the policy of “sowing the 
oil” of Venezuela in the 1970s, that led to the development of excessively capital-
intensive sectors that experienced serious difficulties or rendered few benefits in the 
following decades. Some of the current diversification policies of the Gulf countries 
into financial services or tourism may perhaps be classified under this category. 
A second issue is related to the “Dutch disease” literature, and may be seen as 
the policy decision to use the revenues associated with the exploitation of the natural 
resource to accumulate foreign exchange assets vs. domestic spending. The crucial 
question here is that the domestic use of the revenues would be generally reflected in a 
real exchange rate appreciation that may accelerate growth in non-tradable activities 
but has adverse effects on other tradable sectors. If there are dynamic economies of 
scale associated with learning (productive experience today increases productivity in 
the associated activities) or with building commercial networks (exporting today builds 
the commercial contacts and reputation of domestic producers in foreign markets), 
long-term growth may be adversely affected (see Krugman, 1987, in relation to the 
effects of the loss of production experience). This may be thought as a case in which 
the exploitation of the natural resource actually reduces productive sector 
diversification (of tradable goods and services), leading to growth patterns that are 
                                                 
4 Note that if technical change is expected to reduce the demand for the resource, it may make sense to 
exploit it today. Chilean nitrates are one case in point. 
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unsustainable once the natural resource is exhausted (or, if mixed with the cyclical 
issues analyzed below, once the price boom is over). So, in this case, the long-term 
effects of exploiting the natural resource may also be counter-productive. 
Both the decision to exploit or leave the resource under ground, and to allocate 
the associated revenues between the accumulation of financial assets and domestic 
spending with more immediate development effects should vary by countries’ level of 
income (Sachs, 2007). Whereas a rich country like Norway rightly may privilege more 
very long term savings, a middle or, even more, a low income country may maximize 
welfare by devoting part of the resources to investment with relatively quick 
development impact. Dutch disease issues may, however, be relatively more important 
for developing countries. 
Note that if the decision is made to accumulate net foreign exchange assets, the 
crucial question goes back to the comparison of the profitability of these investments 
vs. the expected increase in the value of the resource. If the political economy leads to 
risk aversion in those investments, profitability would be low, and it could make sense 
again to just leave the resource under ground. Risky investments lead, in turn, to 
questions regarding evaluation criteria (see below), and both lead to questions of 
transparency. 
A second motive could be called the resilient surplus motive (with the surplus 
referring to the current account). The term “structural” could also be used, if we borrow 
from the Latin American literature of the 1950s (where it was applied to deficits rather 
than surpluses) or from the two gap literature that followed.5 The issue here is the 
tendency of some non-natural resource based economies to run current account 
surpluses that are fairly resilient to growth and even to exchange rate appreciation. 
Depending on the theoretical preferences for which side of identity (1) one prefers to 
look at, it may be seen as a case of “over-competitiveness” in the production of tradable 
goods and services, which may be seen as a case of explicit exchange rate 
undervaluation, as emphasized by the “second Bretton Woods” literature, or a structural 
saving surplus associated commonly with high levels of savings. Since the cases we 
                                                 
5  Interestingly, the change from foreign exchange constraints to “structural” foreign exchange surpluses 
has obviously major implications for development thinking, which are only partly analyzed in this paper. 
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can think of situations of this type are all East Asian, perhaps high savings rates are the 
real determinant factor. 
Indeed, the interpretation that the source of such “resilient surplus” is the 
undervaluation of the domestic currency may some times be correct but it can also be 
problematic. The point is that there may no “equilibrium” exchange rate that eliminates 
the surplus because of the many macroeconomic links between the exchange rate, 
economic activity and the domestic financial system. A strong appreciation of the 
exchange rate may directly reduce the current account surplus, but it may also generate 
(generally with a lag) adverse effects on domestic economic activity or on the domestic 
financial system that may tend to further increase the surplus, by generating a recession 
that reduces import demand, inducing higher savings or generating a domestic asset 
bubble that eventually busts. Japan is the best example: after the massive appreciation 
of the 1980s, the surplus was not eliminated. One explanation is that the massive 
appreciation led to the domestic financial crises and long-term stagnation that plagued 
Japan during the 1990s and into the 2000s. A similar explanation has been used by 
some authors to analyze the Chinese situation today and to claim that a massive sudden 
appreciation of the Yuan does not make sense (Genberg et al., 2005). Indeed, this 
argument may be behind the preference of Chinese policy makers for a gradual 
appreciation of the exchange rate. 
The third may be called the counter-cyclical motive. We must differentiate, 
however, between two entirely different situations. The first case relates to cyclical 
swings in real exports (volumes) associated with foreign business cycles (global or of 
the relevant trading partners). The second, and the most relevant for Latin America 
today, is associated with cyclical swings in external prices, particularly commodity 
prices. Both issues have certain features in common: the possibility of overheating of 
the domestic economy during the boom that would lead, depending on the exchange 
rate regime, to variable mixes of domestic inflation and nominal exchange rate 
appreciation, resulting in both cases in real exchange rate appreciation. 
Such appreciation may play a positive role in managing the boom and in 
distributing its benefits to economic agents that operate in markets that are “non-
tradable” in character, including workers (wages). The major problems result again 
from the “Dutch disease” effects associated with dynamic economies of scale in 
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tradable sectors. In this case, smoothing out exchange rate trends has positive impacts 
on long-term growth. A necessary tool would be the official intervention in foreign 
exchange markets and the accumulation of the associated surplus either in the central 
bank (reserves) or in a stabilization fund. The alternative is, of course, paying off 
foreign debts or encouraging other forms of capital outflows. 
When the source is a commodity boom, there is an advantage but also a 
complication for the design of stabilization vehicles. The advantage results from the 
easy identification and, therefore, design of the stabilization instrument, which would 
take the form of fund financed by a tax on the booming commodity (which could be 
used later on to stabilize prices in the downswing, and could then be called a 
“retention”, to use the terminology that was typical of the National Coffee Fund of 
Colombia) or part of the associated government revenues (particularly those coming 
from taxes on mineral resources and revenues from state-owned enterprises operating 
in that sector). The complication arises because cyclical patterns may be difficult to 
differentiate from long-term trends, as commodity price dynamics exhibit “random 
walks” or “shock persistence” –that is, price changes that are not reversed. Some of 
them may be fairly large, such as the collapse of commodity prices in the 1980s or, 
according to the view of many observers, the current boom in oil prices (and perhaps 
other mineral commodities). It is thus difficult to find a rule that identifies the cyclical 
component of a price boom vs. its possible long-term character that would make it 
possible to distinguish ex ante between the “transitory” and the “permanent” 
component of the shock. This leads, in turn, to political economy issues that are well 
known: the tendency, at least in the past, to think that it is the latter rather than the 
former, a fact that has led too often to pro-cyclical policies that resulted in 
unsustainable booms followed by major crises. 
The fourth can be called the strict self-insurance motive, which we could argue 
applies when the source of the abundance of foreign exchange is the capital rather than 
the current account. In this case, the analysis of the previous section applies. Since 
capital flows are strongly pro-cyclical for developing countries, the relevant criteria are 
the risks of capital flow reversibility. Thus, self-insurance should be higher the larger 
the share of more volatile capital flows (a differentiation which, as we said, is 
increasingly difficult in practice) and the more open the capital account. And, as 
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identity (2) indicates, its reference should be broad money, an issue that has been 
underscored in the recent literature on self-insurance. 
Precisely because commodity prices and capital flows are pro-cyclical, there are 
many interactions among the different motives. Thus, savings associated with the first 
motive tend to take place when there are buoyant commodity prices, and there is thus 
an implicit stabilization function in the ways funds are managed –only save in the fund 
above a certain threshold price or if there is a budget surplus, and even use the funds 
below a lower threshold price or when the government runs a budget deficit (Davis et 
al, 2003). 
Pro-cyclicality of capital flows generates, in turn, an interaction of the first three 
motives with the fourth. So, any current account surplus will tend to attract capital 
inflows, not only because of the booming economic activity and high profitability that 
is usually associated with such surpluses, but also of the tendency to a real exchange 
rate appreciation that makes domestic currency denominated assets more attractive 
relative to foreign assets. The major problem is that the booming capital inflows will 
compound the difficulties of managing the real factors that underlie the current account 
surplus, basically by adding a component of “irrational exuberance” to the boom, to use 
the expression popularized by Alan Greenspan (see also Schiller, 2000), fuelling the 
demand boom, the real exchange rate appreciation and associated Dutch disease effects, 
and generating excessive risk taking that may be reflected in a financial crises down the 
road. Indeed, one of the major counter-cyclical issues may be the management of the 
financial euphoria associated with booms, a fact that may be compounded by the 
instruments used to absorb the resources. In the limit, of course, the additional demand 
and real exchange rate appreciation generated by the induced capital account boom 
may erase the current account surplus or turn it into a deficit. This dynamics has been 
all too familiar in the gestation of the crises that have plagued the developing world in 
recent decades. 
Table 2 summarizes in a simple table the basic motivations for the accumulation 
of foreign exchange assets, differentiating two dimensions: the source of the boom (a 
long-term or short-term current account surplus, or net capital inflows), and the role 
played by commodities vs. other factors influencing foreign exchange abundance. 
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Table 2 
Basic motivation for the accumulation of foreign exchange assets by developing countries 
    Long-term    Short-term  Capital flows 
    current account  current account   
    surplus   surplus    
Commodities  Wealth Substitution Counter-cyclical    
       (prices)    
 
Non-commodities  Resilient surplus  Counter-cyclical  Self-insurance 
       (volumes) 
 
C. The instruments and political economy of foreign exchange asset accumulation 
The motives clearly determine the nature of the fund that should be used and the 
composition of its investments. SWFs are the appropriate instrument when there is a 
current account surplus and, particularly, when it is clearly long-term in character (or at 
least when such surpluses are long lasting). Or, to use the terminology of the previous 
section, savings funds are the appropriate instrument to respond to the first two motives 
(wealth substitution and resilient surplus). 
The polar case is that of the self-insurance motive. It is difficult to justify a SWF 
in this case. Indeed, as we have argued, any fund that is created on the basis of net 
capital inflows would in fact be an international financial intermediary, as it would 
basically channel capital inflows for lending or investment abroad. It could then make a 
sense to create a development bank or fund if capital flows are deemed to be stable. In 
that case, the bank or fund could intermediate such capital flows by channeling those 
resources to neighboring countries, including in infrastructure projects that could 
encourage trade with them, or accumulate part of those funds in regional or sub-
regional development banks that have a similar purpose. And, of course, private 
financial institutions can do such international financial intermediation. To the extent 
that not all capital inflows are deemed to be stable, self insurance calls for 
accumulating foreign exchange reserves in central banks and investing them in very 
liquid instruments. If reserves are very large, due to massive capital inflows, there is 
the temptation to use part of them to create a SWF, but this temptation should probably 
be avoided –though return considerations in the investments of foreign exchange 
reserves could weight more in reserve asset management. 
The stabilization motive lies in between these two polar cases, and could be 
managed through variable mixes of SWF (stabilization funds in this case) and reserves. 
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The strength and duration of the boom should certainly be a criterion in the choice 
between the two, as is the estimate of how long it would last. 
 A major issue in all cases is the private vs. public sector composition of the 
associated surpluses. This is, of course, crucial to guarantee the “sterilization” of their 
monetary effects. In this regard, a fiscal surplus is the easiest to manage, as it can be 
automatically sterilized by either investing directly abroad or in central bank bonds 
(non-monetary liabilities). Such fiscal surplus can be generated by a general tax or a tax 
on the source of the boom (if it is a natural resource), or the profits of public sector 
firms operating in the sector (a typical feature of oil exporting economies, as well as 
copper in Chile). In the second case, and if the source is a temporary commodity price 
boom, the instrument can be a “retention” of the excess revenue to be given back to 
producers when prices fall (as was typical of the National Coffee Fund of Colombia in 
the past), or simply a tax of the windfall (as is currently done in Argentina). If the 
source of the surplus is “over-competitiveness” or private capital flows, the 
appropriation of the resources by the public sector is more complex. However, the 
allocation of social security assets or “forced savings” imposed by legislation on private 
agents (as in Singapore) can be used for that purpose. 
When there is no public sector surplus, the associated sterilization is a difficult 
issue –and a costly one, as we have seen, particularly when domestic interest rates are 
high. The major problem is that sterilization implies that the central bank (or, 
alternatively, the SWF, if it assigned with the responsibility of doing so) will press 
domestic interest rates, a factor that attract new capital flows and feed into the domestic 
financial euphoria. This is particularly complex if the central bank uses (or is forced to 
do so by domestic regulation) only short-term instruments, as the high rotation of 
sterilization instruments becomes a risk in itself and feeds into the general environment 
of excess liquidity. 
A related issue has to do with asset allocation strategies for SWFs and whether 
these should vary by type of fund and by the origin of the surpluses (commodity versus 
non-commodity). In principle, return may be more important than liquidity for SWFs, 
and they should therefore invest in longer-term assets with a different risk/return mix 
that is typical assets held in official reserves. The main reason for this lies in the more 
long term horizon of these funds, that allows greater tolerance of short-term fluctuations 
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in returns. An example is the Norwegian Fund, which reportedly holds 40% of its assets 
in equities (Noyer, 2007). Obviously, in all cases asset allocation should be subject to 
strong prudential rules 
Three additional considerations seem relevant here. Firstly, as the assets of 
SWFs belong to all the citizens of a country and their children (many of whom have low 
incomes), there may be a greater need for prudence in investment by SWFs owned by 
developing countries, so as to have lower levels of risk than say wealthy individuals are 
willing to bear. Therefore, the criteria for choosing a portfolio of assets may be 
somewhat different for SWFs than for private management of assets. As a consequence, 
central banks or governments may wish to either manage assets themselves or define 
clearly and monitor carefully the level of risk that fund managers are accepting on their 
SWF investments. 
Secondly, the investments by SWFs (or a part of them) should serve long term 
development objectives of the country as well as ensure good long term returns. As in 
the case of investments in development banks or funds (which could be a potential use 
of the SWF resources), part of these investments could go into financing projects in 
neighboring countries or the country may wish to invest in companies abroad in more 
developed economies for reasons such as gaining access to new and better technologies. 
However, it is important that such criteria are transparent, and that other objectives are 
not inappropriately used as an excuse for low financial returns. It is also interesting that, 
as Ang (2008) points out that, the Norwegian SWF aims at generating a “sound return 
in the long term, which is contingent on sustainable development in the economic, 
environmental and social sense.” Emphasis on sustainable development as an aim is 
equally, or indeed more desirable for developing country SWFs. 
Thirdly, it is important to distinguish between savings funds, which can invest 
with longer term criteria, and stabilization funds, which – given their cyclical role – 
would seem to need higher proportions of relatively more liquid assets. In this sense, 
stabilization funds’ liquidity needs can be seen as intermediate between normal foreign 
reserves –requiring high levels of liquidity– and savings funds, with far longer term 
horizons. Further research and discussions with policy-makers are required to clarify 
appropriate criteria of investment for different categories of developing country funds, 
as well as for countries with different levels of income. 
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There are, finally, several political economy issues that are not easy to manage. 
Some, as we have seen, relate political economy pressures that may result in the 
excessive consumption of the natural resource today or investments with low marginal 
social benefits. As we have pointed out, there is also the entrenched tendency to think of 
commodity price booms as permanent rather than transitory, which leads to pro-cyclical 
policies that result unsustainable. Furthermore, during both current and capital account 
booms, it is difficult to argue in political terms for counter-cyclical fiscal policies to 
compensate for private sector “exuberance”—particularly exuberance that benefits in 
developing countries the richest segments of society (Marfán, 2005). Note, however, 
that the political economy may lead in the opposite direction, towards excessive 
regulation of asset allocation by SWFs which indicates strong risk aversion. If the 
source of the boom is the exploitation of a non-renewable natural resource, the best 
conservative strategy could actually be to just leave the resource under ground. 
 An equally important political economy issue relates to the stability of the rules 
that lead to the accumulation of resources in public funds. In this regard, there are 
classical time inconsistency issues: large public sector savings during booms may 
generate strong political incentives to spend them (the pressure that Chile is facing after 
it accumulated large fiscal savings during the recent copper boom) or to dilapidate them 
in the form of unsustainable tax cuts (the US experience during the current decade after 
the fiscal surplus of the 1990s). Latin America does not do well in this regard, as the 
copious design of stabilization funds and fiscal responsibility rules since the late 1990s 
has been followed by equally frequent changes in those rules in recent years (Jiménez y 
Tromben, 2006). 
 Obviously, the decision to accumulate resources in SWFs must be consistent 
with general fiscal rules. It does not make sense in this regard to transfer resources to a 
SWF if broader fiscal rules do not guarantee that the country is running a fiscal surplus. 
And, for the same reason, it would also be inappropriate to use the resources of the 
SWF to guarantee public sector debt. 
 The rules regarding the allocation of resources also raise several political 
economy questions. As already pointed out, the political economy may lead to risk 
aversion and low profitability. The opposite problem, as already pointed out, is 
important: how to avoid excessively risky investments. Both raise issues of evaluation 
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criteria, transparency and accountability. Technical independence of the associated 
decision making process is also crucial. These issues have traditionally been well 
managed in the case of international reserves, where clear rules prevail (liquidity over 
return) and there is technical independence of central banks. For this reason, perhaps the 
tradition of several countries of assigning the management of either savings or 
stabilization funds to central banks is a good one. 
V. SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF LARGE RESERVES AND SWFs 
As highlighted in section III, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by 
developing countries is partly a consequence of deep financial integration and the 
instability that it generates. Strong pro-cyclical swings in external financing also limit 
the room to maneuver that developing countries have to adopt counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. As we have seen, during the current decade, the most common 
response of developing countries to the challenges posed by financial instability has 
been massive “self-insurance” in the form of a large accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves, which can also be understood as an attempt to increase macroeconomic policy 
autonomy. This has been, therefore, a rational response by individual countries to a 
system that lacks a well functioning collective insurance against balance of payments 
crises and severely reduces macroeconomic policy autonomy. 
On top of that, the recent boom in commodity prices and, more generally, export 
revenues, has led to the desire by developing countries to save a proportion of the 
additional export revenues. These counter-cyclical policies are also a rational response 
to exceptional export income, and serve both to cool the aggregate demand effects of 
booming export markets as well as to avoid the Dutch disease effects of high 
commodity prices. 
This behavior of developing countries raises, however, two types of concerns. 
For individual countries, “self-insurance” raises questions about the rationality of 
capital inflows and capital liberalization in general, as the former do not generate a net 
transfer of resources, and the second generates a costly accumulation of foreign 
exchange assets to counter the risks associated with a more liberalized capital account 
regime.  
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For the world economy as a whole, self insurance as well as counter-cyclical 
policies to manage export booms by a large group of developing countries generate, in 
turn, “fallacy of composition” effects that feed into global imbalances (Ocampo, 2007a). 
Indeed, if a large group of developing countries follows these routes, they generate 
current account surpluses and/or additional demand for liquid assets that have 
contractionary effects on the world economy unless matched by current account deficits 
and the additional supply of those liquid assets by other, mainly industrial countries. 
The US has been playing those roles in recent years, but this has generated major 
imbalances that are subject to ongoing corrections, both at the macroeconomic and the 
financial sector level. 
Therefore, self-insurance and counter-cyclical policies to manage export booms, 
though rational from the perspective of each individual economy, are also sources of 
global imbalances and, therefore, of the potential instability to the world economy. 
What is evident, however, is that these problems cannot be solved simply by asking 
developing countries to appreciate their currencies to correct the balance of payments 
surpluses. It must be solved first by coordinated global counter-cyclical policies and by 
attacking the source of the demand for “self-insurance”, which is the lack of adequate 
supply of collective insurance against balance of payments crises. 
One of the implications of the large accumulation of foreign exchange assets by 
developing countries has also been –intentionally or unintentionally—less reliance on 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and especially on the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Current imbalances also reflect, as we have already pointed, 
coordination problems at the regional level that lead to competitive accumulation of 
reserves aimed at maintaining weak currencies. The strengthening of regional 
institutions like FLAR and the macroeconomic policy dialogues that take place in the 
context of sub-regional integration processes in Latin America, or the Chiang Mai 
Initiative in East Asia, can play an important role in correcting such coordination 
failures. These regional institutions can provide both a counter-cyclical supply of 
foreign exchange that reduces the demand for foreign exchange assets by individual 
countries, as well as institutional mechanisms for macroeconomic policy dialogue and 
eventual policy coordination. 
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Indeed, one of the opportunities generated by the accumulation of foreign 
exchange assets by developing countries is the possibility of creating strong regional 
financial institutions, both for macroeconomic policy support but also for development 
cooperation. It is interesting that if a very small proportion of the total developing 
country SWF assets and international reserves were invested in existing or new 
development banks owned by developing countries, this could generate a very large 
expansion of such developing country owned banks’ lending capacity, which could be 
devoted to regional public goods, such as infrastructure. As estimated in Griffith-Jones 
et al. (2008), 1% of SWFs assets allocated to paid-in capital for expansion or creation of 
developing country owned development banks could approximately generate annual 
new lending capacity of around US$70 billion annually, which would approximately 
triple total current lending by World Bank plus the three major regional development 
banks that provide lending to developing countries (the Inter-American, the Asian and 
the African Development Banks). 
It therefore seems the time is now for developing countries to create strong 
mechanisms for monetary cooperation (swap arrangements and reserve funds, in 
particular) and expand their own regional or sub-regional banks, or indeed to increase 
financial cooperation on a larger scale. Thus a systemic implication  of the accumulation 
of foreign exchange assets by developing countries is that it represents but also feeds 
into ongoing changes in the global power structure. It potentially gives more bargaining 
power to developing countries in international negotiations; equally, or more 
importantly, it allows greater policy space to national policy-makers and provides a 
major opportunity to expand intra-regional as well as inter-regional financial 
cooperation among developing countries. 
Whereas the large accumulation of foreign exchange assets by developing 
countries as a group could have fed into current global imbalances, in a rather 
unexpected way SWFs have also made a significant contribution to international 
financial stability, by helping recapitalize some of the largest international banks as 
these faced major losses due to the sub-prime crisis and the financial turbulence it 
generated (see Table 3). Large banks have been hit by extremely high losses, which 
could possibly have not only led to serious problems for individual banks, but also 
potential systemic effects. In every case, purchases of shares by the SWFs – typically 
announced at the same time as major losses – helped calm fears about banks’ solvency 
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and helped contain the inevitable reduction of share prices. Thus it could be said that 
SWFs suddenly became the capital provider of first and last resort. This is why the 
concept of “bail out” has been used to describe these operations, though perhaps 
inappropriately.  
A reason why SWF investment in banks has been welcomed is because they 
tend to take relatively small shares in banks, and none of them sit on bank boards. 
Additionally, SWFs are perceived as having longer term horizons (for example as 
compared with private equity or hedge fund investors) which makes them less sensitive 
to market volatility. 
 
Table 3 
Significant Acquisitions by Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Date Target Acquirer US$bn
23/07/2007 Barclays Temasek Holdings 2
19/12/2007 Morgan Stanley China Investment Corporation 5
24/12/2007 Merrill Lynch Temasek Holdings 4.4
15/01/2008 Kuwait Investment Authority 2
15/01/2008 Korea Investment Authority 2
27/11/2007 Citigroup Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 7.5
15/01/2008 Singapore Government Investment Corporation 6.9
15/01/2008 Kuwait Investment Authority 3
10/12/2007 UBS Singapore Government Investment Corporation 11.5
Total 44.3  
Source: Financial Times 
As a result of these reasons (and especially the urgent need for capital), SWFs’ 
large investments into large banks with high losses have been broadly welcomed.6 This 
is in sharp contrast to the protectionist fervor that blocked previous non-financial 
investments, as was the case with Dubai and US ports and China with a medium-sized 
US oil company. 
Allowing SWFs to invest more generally in OECD countries can have another 
important, though indirect, effect on global economic stability. To the extent that it is 
                                                 
6 Some exceptions were the objections (probably temporary) by some UBS shareholders, as they argued 
that the terms obtained by the SWFs in their capitalization were unfair to original shareholders. 
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desirable to avoid too high commodity (especially oil) prices, given their negative 
effects on inflation, it is important that SWFs face no or few restrictions on their 
investments, so that they can maximize and diversify expected returns on their financial 
assets. Should they not be able to do so, then it may become more attractive for them to 
keep the oil and other mineral resources under ground, which is likely to lead to higher 
oil and commodity prices (see, for example, Reisen, 2008). 
More broadly, if “financial protectionism” in developed countries became too 
widespread –with too many barriers and requirements imposed on developing country 
SWF investments– the willingness of different types of developing countries to engage 
in such a cooperative way in the global economy as they currently do could 
understandably become eroded. Calls for increased transparency of SWFs by a number 
of developed countries, and by several international institutions, where rich countries 
are dominant, may have some value in this regard, as transparency could reduce 
financial protectionism. However, it would be far more legitimate if a similar call is 
made for other financial actors, such as hedge funds, private equity and investment 
banks, so that it does not look at a case of “Do as I say, not as I do”, an issue that has 
led to strong resistance to advice from industrial countries in the developing world. 
Therefore, the call should be symmetrical: all financial institutions should be 
transparent. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 The large accumulation of foreign exchange assets by developing countries has 
become a characteristic feature of the 2000s. Although in quantitative terms the 
expansion of foreign exchange reserves is the dominant feature, the accumulation of 
assets in SWFs is of parallel and growing importance. On average, developing countries 
have been accumulating international reserves to absorb both part of the booming export 
revenues and the additional pro-cyclical net capital inflows. For those countries facing 
current account deficits, the accumulated reserves are a reflection of the second 
phenomenon and are thus essentially “borrowed”. This is indeed the dominant effect in 
Latin America. 
 We differentiated four different motives for the accumulation of foreign 
exchange assets. The first two, which we called the “wealth substitution motive” 
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(transform a natural resource into financial assets) and the “resilient surplus motive” 
(long-lasting current account surpluses that cannot be corrected in the short-run by 
exchange rate appreciation. These two motives are behind those SWFs that are savings 
funds in character –and indeed, we argued strongly that, in strict sense, these are the 
only two motivations that should lead to the creation of SWFs. A third motive, the 
counter-cyclical one, calls for either stabilization funds or the accumulation of 
international reserves to absorb temporary current account surpluses and, in some cases, 
fiscal effects associated with booming commodity prices or export revenues in general. 
A fourth motive, self-insurance, aims at reducing the risks associated with pro-cyclical 
capital flows. In all cases, avoiding the dynamic economies of scale associated with the 
Dutch disease is a major justification of the accumulation of foreign exchange assets, 
but they must be weighted against the costs of sterilizing the monetary effects of 
booming foreign exchange inflows when there are no fiscal surpluses to undertake that 
function. As we have argued, different motives generate a demand for different types of 
funds, each category requiring somewhat diverse investment criteria. 
Finally, we underscored that fact that, although the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves by developing countries is partly a consequence of deep financial 
integration and the instability that it generates, such actions feed into global imbalances 
through “fallacy of composition” effects. Therefore, though these strategies may be 
rational for each developing country, they feed into global imbalances. The lack of 
adequate coordination mechanisms, both at the global and regional levels, may have 
accentuated this problem. At the same time, SWFs have played a somewhat unexpected 
stabilizing role, by providing the funds that have helped to stabilize the developed 
countries’ banking system during the current world financial turbulence. And they have 
also generated an important opportunity to increase financial cooperation among 
developing countries, both on a regional basis but also on a broader scale. Given these 
vast new opportunities available, further study and policy action seems highly desirable. 
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